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Introduction
The perception of the inflation aversion of a central bank plays a key role in determining whether its goal of low inflation is attained. This point is, by now, a standard theoretical result.
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It is also received wisdom among practitioners. In a survey of the heads of 84 central banks, as well as 52 prominent academic monetary economists, Blinder (2000) finds that anti-inflation credibility is considered vitally important and "helps keep inflation low." 2 This consensus on the importance of the perception of inflation aversion naturally leads to the question of how it is achieved, and whether and how it evolves over time. One view is that establishing an appropriate institutional structure is the key element in insulating the monetary authority from political pressure and thereby convincing markets that a central bank has strong aversion to inflation. A second, more dynamic, view focuses on the role that actual policy conduct plays in building the reputation of a central bank. These two different views have distinct implications for the relative importance of the institutional structure of a central bank as compared to its conduct for attaining and maintaining its credibility.
A majority of respondents to Blinder's survey believe that central bank credibility is based more on its history of actions than on the construction of institutional structures that insulate a central bank from political concerns and afford it independence. Nonetheless, there is also a consensus among respondents that structure matters. This latter view is consistent with empirical research that has found, in cross sections of countries, that institutional structure is associated with economic performance, perhaps because it indicates the ability of an institution to "tie its hands" and commit to a policy that may cause short-term pain in the pursuit of longer-run gain. 3 There is less evidence, however, on whether and how the credibility of a particular central bank evolves over time in response to the conduct of policy.
The questions of the achievement and the maintenance of inflation aversion credibility are especially relevant for a new central bank. An analysis of the experience of the European Central Bank (ECB) during its early years of operation provides a natural experiment for considering this question. The architects of the institutional structure of the ECB were mindful of lessons from economic theory concerning the importance of independence from political considerations. 4 The role of conduct was also clearly apparent. As indicated by the survey results in Blinder (2000) , the directors of central banks are vitally aware that their policies are closely scrutinized for indications of general tendencies. This may be especially true with a new central bank where each policy choice can lead to a larger updating of market priors than would be the case for a long-established central bank.
This paper starts with the insight that the responses of asset prices to economic news embed market perceptions of the policy reaction function of central banks. The relationship between asset prices and news evolves with the change in market perceptions of a central bank's monetary reaction function and its associated degree of inflation aversion. As argued by Bernanke (2004) , "successful monetary policies should stabilize, or "anchor", inflation expectations so as to prevent them from becoming a source of instability in their own right".
Therefore, with asset prices as a starting point, in Section II, we present a framework for a novel test of the evolution of market perceptions of central bank inflation aversion. This test uses high frequency asset price data on the slope of yield curves and on exchange rates, with the surprise components of economic data releases, to estimate whether the market perception of the anti-3 For example, Cukierman (1992) analyzes the charters of central banks and shows, in a cross-country panel, that average inflation is lower in countries in which laws afford central banks greater independence. Alesina and Summers (1993) also find cross-country evidence that the level of inflation, as well as its variability, is negatively associated with indicators of central bank independence, but there is no association between central bank independence and real variables. Questions have been raised, however, about whether the de jure structure is closely linked to the de facto behavior of institutions (Forder 1999) . 4 Despite these lessons, some politicians continued to try to influence policy direction. For example, Oscar Lafontaine, appointed Finance Minister of Germany in the Autumn of 1998, called for the new ECB to lower interest rates from the time of his appointment until his resignation in March 1999. In response, Wim Duisenberg, the first president of the ECB, stated in November 1998 that it was a "normal phenomenon" for politicians to offer their views on the conduct of monetary policy, but "it would be very abnormal if those suggestions were to be listened to." See "Wim Duisenberg, Banker to a New Europe," The Economist, November 26, 1998. inflation credibility of a central bank changes over time. 5 The key insight from this model is that a given surprise increase in inflationary pressures will result in a greater increase in a long interest rate relative to a short interest rate, and a larger exchange rate depreciation, when a central bank is perceived as being more tolerant of inflation and less credible as an inflation fighter. If unvarying institutional structure is the dominant determinant of a new central bank's credibility, then one would not expect to find a change in the high frequency relationship between economic news and the slope of the yield curve over time. But if credibility for a new central bank is earned through the conduct of its policy, one would find a significant break in the relationship between news and the yield curve as credibility evolves.
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In Section III we apply this test to study the evolution of the credibility of the European Central Bank from the time it began its operations in January 1999 through mid-2005. Using hourly data on the euro-dollar exchange rate and on the term structure of bonds of euro-area countries, we find evidence that the market's perception of the inflation aversion of the ECB has evolved over time and responded to ECB policy actions. As a benchmark for our analysis, and also to identify whether the results we found for the ECB could be attributed to changes in the economic environment rather than in specific views of its inflation aversion, we also test for changes in the market's perception of the monetary reaction function of the Federal Reserve over the same sample period. In contrast to our results for the ECB, we find no evidence of changing perceptions of the reaction function of the Federal Reserve, a result that is not surprising given the Fed's long-standing commitment to price stability under the chairmanship of both Alan
Greenspan and Paul Volcker.
5 Forward market information has been used in other tests of policy regime credibility. For example, Svensson (1991) shows that forward exchange rates were not within the target zone band of the European Monetary System (EMS) in the 1980s, a result he interprets as indicating that the EMS generally did not offer credible bands on its members' currencies. Svensson (1993) presents a similar set of tests to determine whether the inflation targets of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden were consistent with market yields. These tests, while informative, require the presence of an explicit target, like an exchange rate band or an inflation target, to judge credibility. Other related empirical analyses on the policy credibility of an exchange rate target zone use intervention data to estimate perceived target zone bands Lewis 1993 and Lewis 1995) . 6 Klein, Mizrach and Murphy (1991) develop a similar type of analysis concerning differences in the responsiveness of asset prices to news as policy evolves in their study of the changing responsiveness of dollar exchange rates to news about the United States current account. They find the 1985 Plaza Accord altered perceptions of the degree to which American policy was concerned with the U.S. current account deficit.
Central Bank Policy and Market Responses to News
In this section we present a model that shows how changes in perceptions about a policy stance can alter the response of asset prices to news. We begin with the standard framework used in empirical works that study the effect of news on asset prices, as in, for example, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) . We then introduce a policy reaction function, and show how an evolving view of the credibility of central bank inflation aversion affects the relationship between news and asset prices. We discuss the empirical implementation of this model to the yield curve and exchange rates, so that we can use high frequency data to isolate the effects of news on asset prices under different market perceptions of central bank inflation aversion.
Empirical Specification
The standard linear specification linking the surprise component of news to the change in an asset price is In the presence of the perceived policy reaction function, the surprise component of the perceived change in policy, ( )
This expression shows that expected policy can depart from its prior path due to a change in the output gap, due the surprise component of an inflation data release, or due to a change in the target value of inflation.
Provided that there is some news in an inflation report relative to market expectations, ) (
is not equal to zero. In a short window of time around the inflation report, for example an hour window, in the absence of a simultaneous announcement of a change in target inflation, or of news on real economic variables such as the output gap, the other two right hand side terms of equation (4) can be set equal to zero. With news affects on equilibrium real interest rates common to returns at all horizons along the yield curve, when we difference across the returns of long and short-dated bonds we abstract from the effect of news on equilibrium real returns. Over short windows around news announcements, differencing also abstracts from the effect of news on term premia or liquidity premia. In this case, the regressand t t+ − − is the expected change in the differential in the long horizon (for example, 10 years) and short horizon (for example 2 years) inflation rates due to the news announcement (5) ) ( ) ( 2 10 2 10
if x and V are uncorrelated, but, even if this is not the case, the qualitative effects discussed below are not affected if x and V are negatively correlated. If x and V are positively correlated, we would expect the sign on λ to be positive in the policy reaction function. We would not expect, in a sample with many observations, many instances where ) ( where 10 t π is the average expected inflation rate over 10 years and 2 t π is the average expected inflation rate over 2 years. 9 The change in the slope of the yield curve over short horizons reflects the evolution of inflation expectations across the term structure.
Substituting (4) into (2), and interpreting . If perceptions of inflation aversion were unvarying, perhaps because these perceptions were solely driven by the initial and unvarying institutional structure, we would expect to find a stable relationship between the slope of a central bank's yield curve and inflation news. 9 Fleming and Remolona (1999) also argue that the effects of news on asset prices of different maturities reveals information about market participant beliefs about central bank reaction functions. Research by Estrella, Rodriguez and Schich (2002) focuses on the relationship between the slope of the yield curve and subsequent real activity and inflation. Using monthly data from 1967 to December 1998, the German yield curves were found to be most informative at inflation prediction horizons beyond two years, while the US term structure was most informative at somewhat shorter horizons. Such analyses, building on Estrella and Mishkin (1997) , also argue that inversions in the slope of the yield curve have been successful as recession predictors. The measured strength of these relationships are not stable over time, and vary with the maturity horizons of the bonds examined. Early research by Huizinga and Mishkin (1986) applied to monthly data for the United States recognizes the sensitivity of the slope of the yield curve to perceptions of monetary policy regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. These studies do not examine the effects of news announcements on the slope of the yield curve, or use high frequency data as in our study. 10 If news alters the perception of the target level of x, we could find evidence of a time-varying intercept as well since, in that case, we would have 
Evolving Perceptions of European Central Bank Policy
In this section we present the data, methodology, and results of our tests for changes in the market's perception of the anti-inflation stance of the European Central Bank during its first six-and-one-half years of operation, from January 1999 through June 2005. We begin, in Section 3.1, with a description of the data we use for these tests. Five different dependent variables are examined: the change in the term spread (alternatively called the change in the slope of the yield curve) for German, French and Italian government bonds, the change in the Euro/dollar exchange rate, and the change in the term spread of United States government bonds. The tests for possible parameter instability of the United States term spread is offered as a benchmark;
were we to find evidence of parameter instability for regressions based on this series, we would be concerned that evidence of parameter instability using European bond yields may not, in fact, reflect an evolving perception of ECB inflation aversion but, rather, some structural change common to financial markets across all four of these industrial countries. Likewise, an absence of parameter instability in the euro-dollar exchange rate regression could support a common structural change across U.S. and euro-area markets However, as shown in Section 3.3, we find no evidence of parameter instability for the regressions using the United States term spread series while we do find significant evidence of a change in the term spread for the tests using the other four series using the Elliott -Müller test. In Section 3.4 we present estimates of the time path of ) ( i φλ γ − using the Müller -Petalas procedure, and link these time paths to actual policy changes undertaken by the ECB. Finally, in Section 3.5, to demonstrate the robustness of our results, we present sup-Wald tests for a discrete break in the regression relationship and the dates associated with those breaks.
Data
The two types of data used in our analysis are various asset prices, where the assets are government bonds and foreign exchange, and inflation announcements and related market expectations. We begin this section with a discussion of the five different asset prices used as dependent variables in our estimation. We then describe our construction of inflation surprises.
Asset Price Data:
Five different dependent variables will be used in the regressions. In each case, the dependent variable, 14 Although our primary emphasis is on evolving credibility of the ECB, and we introduce European bonds for constructing yield curves, our choice of inflation report is the U.S. core CPI release, not European inflation series. Taking the monetary reaction function literally, this choice would imply that the ECB reacts to U.S. inflation news. Our specification does not preclude an ECB reaction function to other more local inflation series as well. It does, however, make explicit an assumption that U.S. inflation reports contain information perceived as relevant for Europe and euro-area monetary policy. We choose U.S. inflation data because there is extensive evidence showing the rich news content of this data for euro area asset prices. This evidence stands in stark contrast with weak effects of inflation reports from Germany, Italy, France, or Europe as a whole.
15 United States macroeconomic news affects both United States and 12 The change in the exchange rate over this short time horizon is a reflection of a change in the expected value of the exchange rate at some longer horizon which, in turn, reflects some form of long-run purchasing power parity. 13 A similar joint use of interest rate data and exchange rate data was used by Engel and Frankel (1984) to analyze the response of interest rates to monetary announcements. 14 For a nice overview of the evidence and related literature, see Clark (2001) . 15 Recent relevant studies include Andersen et al (2003) , Goldberg and Leonard (2003) , Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2003) , Chinn and Frankel (2004) and Ehrmann and Fratscher (2004 
Econometric Methods
New econometric tests developed by Elliott and Müller (2005) allow one to test for the presence of persistent time variation in one or more regression coefficients over the sample period without specifying the exact breaking process, such as breaks that occur in a random fashion, serial correlation in the changes of coefficients, or a clustering of break points. 18 This feature of their test makes it well suited for our purposes since we do not need to test for a particular type of updating by market participants of their views on central bank inflation aversion. The Elliott and Müller (2005) "quasi-Local Level" (qLL) statistic takes a negative value, and a value smaller (more negative) than the critical value implies a failure to reject time 16 As robustness checks, we also examine the implications of alternative U.S. price news, and of a range of measures of European price news. Our results are robust to other measures, but these other measures sometimes have small and volatile effects on bond yields or the slope of the yield curve. 17 Money Market Services were the source of these data through December 2003. Haver Analytics provided continuous expectations and announcement data through 2005 using data from Action Economics. Gurkaynek and Wolfers (2005) show that these data have been among the best performing expectations series for important macroeconomic variables over the sample period that we analyze. 18 Elliott and Müller write that, for their tests, "…the precise form of the breaking process [of the coefficients] is irrelevant for the asymptotic power of the tests." (p.10) An implication of this is that "From a practical perspective… the researcher does not have to specify the exact path of the breaking process in order to be able to carry out (almost) efficient inference." (p. 4) variation in one or more coefficients for the entire sample period. This procedure tests for time variation over the entire sample and, as such, does not identify a particular date as the one most likely to represent a discrete break point.
While an unspecified evolution of ) ( First, we compare the test results across euro area countries, the euro-dollar exchange rate, and the benchmark case of the yield curve for U.S. assets. Given the integration of European and U.S. financial markets, as recently documented by Bartolini, Hilton, and Prati (2005) , it would be unusual for a γ change to occur across euro area bond markets but not for U.S. bond markets.
The second way we attempt to identify the source of changes in ) ( i φλ γ − is by estimating its path over time and considering whether its movements correlate to actual changes in ECB policy. We do this estimation using the method developed by Müller and Petalas (2005) to estimate the smoothed time path of a time-varying parameter.
Finally, we test for the robustness of both the finding of parameter instability and the timing of changes in ) ( i φλ γ − by presenting sup-Wald tests for parameter stability (see Andrews 1993 Andrews , 2003 . These tests are predicated on the existence of one or more discrete break points.
They are conducted by running 0.7×T regressions, where T is the number of observations in the data set, that take the form (6 
Time Variation in the Effects of News on the Slope of the Yield Curve
In this section we report the results of the Elliott and Müller (2005) qLL statistic for the five asset price series discussed above. These statistics are negative, and a smaller (i.e. more negative) value of the statistic allows one to reject the null hypothesis of a lack of persistent time variation in the effect of news on inflation expectations. Thus, suppose there was an evolving view of the policy stance of the ECB over time, but not of the Fed over this same period. We would expect to see a smaller qLL statistic than some critical value for regressions using the change in the term spread for German, French and Italian government bonds, as well as for the change in the euro / dollar exchange rate, but a qLL statistic larger than this critical value for a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the term spread on United States government bonds.
Results of this test are presented in Table 1 . 21 The first row is a test of the general persistent variation in the slope coefficient only. The second row is a joint test of the general persistent variation in both the slope and the intercept coefficients. Critical values are included in the bottom row of the table. Entries in bold and italic represent a qLL statistic that is significant at better than the 99 percent level of confidence, bold entries represent a qLL statistic that is significant at between the 95 percent and 99 percent levels of confidence, and italic entries represent a qLL statistic that is significant at between the 90 percent and 95 percent levels of confidence.
19 The sup-Wald tests require trimming, that is, fewer than T regressions are run for a sample with T observations. Andrews (1993) suggests the use of symmetric 15% trimming and therefore, in this case, the test would involve 0.7×T regressions. There is no comparable trimming in the Elliott and Müller test. 20 Estrella and Rodriguez (2005) propose an alternative technique, where the hypothesis tested is a one-sided directional change, increase or decrease, in the estimated parameters. 21 As suggested by Elliott and Müller (2005) , we allow for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the variancecovariance matrix of the score series { }
by using the Newey-West (1987) correction. The results in Table 1 The second row of qLL statistics in Table 1 present results of a test of the joint persistent time variation of the slope and intercept terms of a regression that takes the form of specification (6) (footnote 11 presents a discussion of the possibility of persistent time variation in the intercept as well as the slope). There is even stronger evidence of persistent time variation in this joint test for the change in the term spread for German bonds and the change in the euro / dollar exchange rate, but weaker evidence for persistent time variation when the dependent variable is the change in the term spread of either French or Italian government bonds. Again, the , using the technique developed by Müller and Petalas (2005) . They show how to estimate the parameter path for general unstable time series models by minimizing a weighted average risk criterion, a procedure that is akin to a smoothing problem. This procedure requires only general assumptions about the true persistent time variation of the coefficients. . See their paper for details, and for an outline of how to implement their procedure. 23 The key interest rate on fixed rate tenders was at 3.00 percent from January 1, 1999 through April 9, when it dropped by 50 basis points to 2.50 percent. basis points] and the ECB refined its "two pillar" approach, with the official importance of M3 apparently reduced and a more official role for an inflation goal at or slightly below two percent.
The main refinancing interest rate remained at 2.00 percent from , based on Andrews (1993 Andrews ( , 2003 .
These sup-Wald tests are based on a more restricted assumption concerning the break point than the qLL test but, since a break point rather than the overall stability of the parameter is estimated, the sup-Wald tests also provide a date for the break. We compare these dates to the smoothed parameter paths presented in Section 3.4. Table 2 presents the sup-Wald statistics based on sets of five different regressions that take the form of (6), among which four have as the dependent variable the change in one of the term spreads, and one has as the dependent variable the change in the euro / dollar exchange rate.
The statistics presented in the top section of this table show evidence of a significant break, at better than the 99 percent level of confidence, for the regressions using the change in the term spread for German government bonds and for the euro / dollar exchange rate, and at between the 95 and 99 percent level of confidence for the change in the term spread of Italian government bonds. There is no evidence of a significant discrete break for the regression using the change in the term spread of French or United States government bonds. It is interesting to compare the dates obtained through the sup-Wald tests with the smoothed parameter paths obtained using the Müller and Petalas method. The dates presented in Table 2 
Conclusions
The importance of the reputation of a central bank for the success of its operations is stressed in theory and is evident from practical experience. An important question is whether a central bank gains credibility in its inflation aversion through its institutional structure or through the conduct of policy. This question is especially relevant for a newly established central bank that faces the challenge of establishing its reputation, sometimes in the face of political controversy over the appropriate conduct of monetary policy.
The evolution of the markets' perceptions of the inflation aversion of the European Central Bank since it began operations in January 1999 is interesting for a number of reasons.
One of these reasons is the inherent interest of the economic experience of the euro-zone. A second reason is that the establishment of the European Central bank provides a natural experiment for considering how the reputation of a central bank evolves over time. This episode is a particularly rich vein to mine because of the controversy surrounding the conduct of monetary policy in Europe as the ECB began its operations.
In this paper, we have proposed and executed a novel test for the study of the evolution of market perceptions about the inflation aversion of a central bank through the use of highfrequency data. This methodology and the use of high frequency data provides a unique window into the evolution of perceptions of monetary policy rules, an issue more typically and less precisely addressed using lower frequency data. We find evidence of an evolution of perceptions of the policy stance of the ECB, one linked to its interest rate policy. There is not a similar shift in the market's perception of the policy stance of the Federal Reserve, a period marked by the stability in its leadership, the consistency of its stated goals, and the broad support for its conduct of policy.
